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## The Oversight Role of Parliament in Light of the 2020 Constitutional Amendment

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### Abstract:

Parliamentary oversight, in its concept, objectives, and constitutional foundation, represents a fundamental component of the state's broader oversight framework. It constitutes a central prerogative of the parliament, exercised through various control mechanisms, whether or not they entail political accountability, granted to it with respect to the government's activities. These mechanisms serve as a safeguard for the consolidation of democracy, given that the parliament embodies the will of the people. Accordingly, the activation of parliamentary oversight became a central demand among both popular movements and political actors, a demand that culminated in the constitutional amendment introduced by the 2020 revision. This amendment emerged as an inevitable response to recent developments in Algeria, wherein the constitutional legislator sought to rectify systemic imbalances and reestablish equilibrium among the branches of power, particularly by reaffirming the parliament's role, with special emphasis on its supervisory authority over government operations. One of the most significant innovations introduced was the formal inclusion of interpellation among the mechanisms that invoke the government's political responsibility. Despite these advancements, however, several deficiencies persist in the domain of parliamentary oversight, deficiencies that had been anticipated to be resolved by the revised constitutional text.

**Keywords:** Oversight, Parliament, Government, 2020 Constitutional Amendment.

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## **INTRODUCTION:**

From the adoption of the first Constitution of the Republic to the enactment of the most recent constitutional revision in 2020, the Algerian constitutional legislator has sought to institutionalize a form of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches, structuring their interrelations by delineating the extent to which each branch may intervene in the domain of the other.

In return for the executive's potential involvement in legislative affairs, the Constitution conferred upon parliament a series of instruments enabling it to monitor and evaluate government conduct, commonly referred to as parliamentary oversight. In addition to its fundamental legislative responsibilities, the parliament holds the authority to supervise the actions of the executive branch through a range of mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms may culminate in political accountability and even lead to the government's resignation, while others do not involve such political consequences.

In the context of the transformations currently unfolding in Algeria, including the recent constitutional amendment enacted in response to evolving political, economic, and social demands, as well as to recent developments across various national sectors, this reform reflects the intent of its framers to address longstanding dysfunctions within the Algerian political system. These dysfunctions, evident since independence, have been characterized notably by the excessive concentration of power within a single institution, often to the detriment of others.

Parliamentary oversight constituted one of the central concerns of the expert committee appointed to draft proposals for a comprehensive revision of the Constitution. Numerous actors advocated for the effective activation of oversight mechanisms. According to the mission letter published by the Algerian News Agency on January 2, 2020, the committee was tasked with conducting a thorough analysis and evaluation of the organizational and functional aspects of state institutions.

It was further instructed to submit to the President of the Republic a set of proposals and recommendations aimed at

reinforcing a democratic system grounded in political pluralism and the peaceful alternation of power, while simultaneously safeguarding the country from all manifestations of authoritarianism. Another central task assigned to the committee was to ensure a genuine separation of powers and a more equitable distribution among them by fostering greater coherence in the operation of the executive branch and by reaffirming the status of parliament, particularly with respect to its oversight role in monitoring governmental activity.

The importance of this topic is, therefore, readily apparent. Although a considerable number of constitutional studies have thoroughly examined parliamentary oversight of governmental activity, the subject remains one that necessitates continuous academic attention. This is due not only to its dynamic and evolving nature but also to the need to keep pace with the rapid transformations occurring in the functioning of parliamentary institutions.

Parliamentary oversight continues to represent one of the foundational pillars of the rule of law. It draws its legitimacy directly from the Constitution and functions as a principal mechanism for ensuring the effective implementation of public policies and government programs that have received parliamentary approval.

In this context, the present study seeks to underscore the strengths introduced by the new constitutional amendment, particularly highlighting the most significant additions made in this domain. It also aims to identify the persistent deficiencies that continue to impede the efficacy of parliamentary oversight mechanisms and, where possible, to propose avenues for remedying these limitations.

In contrast to prior studies addressing similar themes, the current research concentrates on the most salient reforms brought about by the 2020 constitutional amendment as they relate specifically to parliamentary oversight of executive action. Within this analytical framework, the central research question posed is as follows: **To what extent has the 2020 constitutional amendment contributed to enhancing parliamentary**

**oversight of governmental activity and to activating the corresponding oversight mechanisms?**

This question will be addressed through two main sections:

**Section One: Parliamentary Oversight Mechanisms That Do Not Impose Political Responsibility in the 2020 Constitutional Amendment**

**Section Two: Parliamentary Oversight Mechanisms That Impose Political Responsibility in the 2020 Constitutional Amendment**

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Alongside the mechanisms through which parliament may trigger political accountability of the executive, there exists a set of alternative tools designed to enable continuous and structured monitoring of government activity. These mechanisms are accessible to both chambers of parliament on equal terms, without distinction in their use, prerequisites, procedures, or effects.

In practical terms, parliamentary practice in Algeria tends to rely more frequently on non-accountability-based oversight instruments. This preference is largely due to the procedural limitations and political risks associated with activating mechanisms that could lead to the government's dismissal or, conversely, the dissolution of parliament, whether through mandatory procedures or by presidential discretion.

The following mechanisms will be examined: parliamentary questions (Subsection One) and parliamentary inquiry committees (Subsection Two).

**Subsection One: Discussion of the Government's Work Program and Updates Related to the Political Program in Question**

Paragraph 1 of Article 158 of the 2020 constitutional amendment stipulates: "Members of parliament may address any oral or written question to any member of the government." The parliamentary question serves as a procedural tool by which a member of parliament seeks clarification from the competent

minister or the Head of Government regarding a specific issue falling within the domain of ministerial or governmental activity. The question may be posed orally, articulated verbally by the deputy during a dedicated parliamentary session and responded to in kind by the government official, thus creating a direct and interactive exchange (Salam, 1983, p. 27).

Alternatively, the question may be submitted in written form, with a corresponding written reply. In either case, the primary aim of this mechanism is to elicit information or clarification on a targeted issue. These issues often relate to the implementation of a specific legal or regulatory provision, or to a component of the government's action plan. They may also address measures adopted by the government in response to specific public concerns, particularly those arising at the local level.

Organic Law No. 16–12 of 25 August 2016, as amended and supplemented by Law No. 23–06 of 18 May 2023, specifically Articles 76 and 76 bis, governs the conduct of hearing sessions. It clearly stipulates that the question must be submitted by the deputy in their capacity as a member of parliament. This capacity constitutes the exclusive legal status under which a question may be addressed. A deputy may not submit a question in any other capacity, such as that of a committee member or chair of a permanent committee (Constitutional Amendment, 2020, art. 158).

Moreover, the parliamentary question is submitted individually, reflecting a personal right conferred upon each deputy. This distinguishes it from other oversight mechanisms, such as interpellation, which require collective initiation. The question remains the only oversight tool that does not require any specific majority for its activation, as explicitly affirmed in paragraph 3 of Article 158 of the 2020 Constitution.

According to Article 158, the minister is required to respond to the question within a maximum period of thirty (30) days. Both chambers of parliament may initiate a debate if they consider the response provided by the government official to warrant further discussion. Parliamentary questions continue to represent the most frequently employed instrument by deputies and members

of parliament, particularly during the sixth and seventh legislative terms.

The 2020 constitutional amendment did not introduce any substantial modifications to this mechanism, which remains limited in its practical impact. The failure to respond to a question carries no direct consequences that could result in political accountability. Although members of parliament may initiate a debate in cases where they find the response unsatisfactory, the overall process remains procedurally weak, as it lacks enforceable outcomes that would effectively subject the government to accountability (Ameller, 1964, p. 54).

Parliamentary investigation is widely regarded as one of the most significant and potentially effective oversight instruments available to the legislative branch for monitoring government performance. This mechanism was first implemented in the United Kingdom and is not exclusive to parliamentary systems; it is also a recognized tool within presidential systems, such as that of the United States. While Algeria's Constitution formally adopts this mechanism, the detailed procedures governing its application have significantly curtailed its actual effectiveness.

Parliamentary investigation constitutes a form of legislative oversight exercised over the executive branch. It involves the establishment of a committee composed of members of parliament tasked with conducting inquiries into issues or incidents of public concern. The purpose of the investigation is to collect all material and non-material information relevant to the issue at hand, utilizing all powers granted by law to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the matter. (Ali, 2009, p. 14)

The subject of parliamentary inquiry committees, as well as the oversight functions exercised by permanent committees, will be addressed as follows:

### **Subsection Two: Parliamentary Inquiry Committees**

Pursuant to Article 159 of the Constitution, each chamber of parliament, within the scope of its constitutional authority, may establish inquiry committees at any time to investigate matters deemed to be of public interest. However, such committees may not be constituted to examine facts or matters already under

judicial investigation. The organic law governing the organization and functioning of the National People's Assembly and the Council of the Nation, as well as their institutional relationship with the executive branch, establishes the legal conditions and procedural framework for forming these committees.

The resulting report is distributed to all members of the concerned chamber and may be published, either partially or in full, only upon recommendation by the bureau of the chamber and subject to a vote of approval by its members. In addition, a closed parliamentary session may be convened to discuss the contents of the report, depending on its sensitivity or political implications (Organic Law No. 16–12, 2016, arts. 78, 81, 84–86).

Upon examining the content of Article 159, it can be said that “parliamentary investigation is a mechanism through which parliament exercises oversight over the government. It is carried out by a committee that uncovers information relevant to the parliament regarding a topic within its jurisdiction. The committee is granted full authority as provided by legal texts, and its mission concludes with the submission of a report to parliament, which holds the final decision-making power” (Abdel-Baqi, 2008).

The constitutional legislator in the 2020 amendment specified that the subject of the inquiry must pertain to matters of public interest. This explicitly excludes issues of personal interest, regional, sectoral, or partisan concerns, as well as matters lacking a national dimension. Organic Law No. 16–12 of 25 August 2016, as amended and supplemented by Law No. 23–06 of 18 May 2023, governs the conditions, procedures, and implications of this mechanism.

However, the 2020 constitutional amendment did not significantly enhance this mechanism, which still operates under restrictive procedures. These limitations continue to reduce the effectiveness of parliamentary inquiries, which often function as mere fact-finding tools rather than as enforceable instruments of oversight.

- **Exercise of Parliamentary Oversight by Standing Committees**

Parliamentary committees are among the most vital components of legislative operations, particularly in ensuring the smooth functioning of the chamber and the fulfillment of its responsibilities, whether legislative, oversight-related, or otherwise. These committees constitute a practical necessity that enables parliament to conduct in-depth examinations of legislative texts and to address a wide range of national issues. As such, they are widely considered the most effective structures within parliamentary institutions (Muti<sup>1</sup>, 1999, p. 91).

These committees function as political “workshops” where examination, study, and debate take place, facilitating ongoing engagement with ministries and promoting institutional cooperation (Dhibih, 2012–2013, p. 271). Their activities benefit from the accumulated expertise and proposals of experienced parliamentarians, thereby fostering a preventive form of oversight and allowing standing committees to play a participatory role in governmental action (Chantbout, 1998, p. 4).

Despite the inherently collective and democratic nature of hearing sessions as a form of oversight, these sessions do not receive the level of attention or emphasis accorded to other parliamentary mechanisms (El-Sawi, 2021, p. 12). This underutilization persists despite their significant potential in fostering dialogue between committee members and government officials, as well as between the government and broader segments of civil society.

These sessions offer a structured space for the exchange of perspectives and for the identification of practical solutions to issues of public concern. Unlike oversight mechanisms that imply punitive measures or formal political consequences, hearing sessions contribute to easing tensions and fostering mutual understanding in the interest of public service.

Standing committees are also empowered to establish temporary fact-finding missions focused on particular topics or specific circumstances. The internal rules of procedure for each chamber

set forth the conditions governing the formation and operation of such missions. This mechanism arose in response to increasing demands for targeted inquiries and is characterized by its temporary nature and narrow thematic scope (Constitutional Amendment, 2020, art. 137, para. 2).

However, the 2020 constitutional amendment affirms that fact-finding missions are to be regarded solely as information-gathering instruments (Constitutional Amendment, 2020, art. 157), and does not formally classify them among the investigative or political oversight tools applicable to government activity.

### **Section Two: Parliamentary Oversight Mechanisms That Impose Political Responsibility in the 2020 Constitutional Amendment**

The constitutional revision enacted in 2020 aimed to curtail the extensive powers previously vested in the executive branch and instead reinforce the prerogatives of the legislative authority. In doing so, it sought to reactivate the parliament's role in the political process by reinvigorating its oversight capabilities over the government's performance. The need to reestablish the parliament's rightful institutional standing and to constitutionally recognize its essential role, liberating it from subordination to the executive, had become increasingly urgent.

A robust and functional state cannot coexist with a marginalized or weakened parliament. The broader objective of institutionalizing reciprocal oversight among the branches of power is to achieve a sustainable balance that safeguards democratic governance and encourages meaningful interaction between institutions through a structured set of constitutional mechanisms. These mechanisms differ in their impact, ranging from those with symbolic or procedural influence to those that are capable of engaging the government's political accountability.

In line with these objectives, the Algerian constitutional legislator enshrined the principle of government accountability before the parliament and conferred upon it a unique character when drafting the provisions related to oversight instruments.

This resulted in a model that diverges in certain respects from those commonly observed in established democratic systems around the world. While the constitutional text explicitly provides for government accountability, this provision is either ineffectively implemented or applied only in a partial manner.

For instance, the individual accountability of government members is not actionable before the parliament in isolation from the collective responsibility of the entire government. This structural limitation stems from the hybrid nature of the Algerian political system, which incorporates features from several governance models, primarily presidential and parliamentary systems, while ultimately privileging the executive authority (Alim, 2020–2021, p. 198).

### **Subsection One: Parliamentary Questions as a Means of Dialogue and an Individual Mechanism for Parliamentary Oversight**

The presentation of the government's action plan constitutes its first official act and serves as the standard point of departure for the government's operations. This mechanism is of considerable significance, as the action plan functions as a general strategic framework that encompasses all sectors, outlining operational modalities and management approaches.

It is subject to parliamentary approval. Under previous constitutional arrangements, the Prime Minister would present the government's action plan before the National People's Assembly without any formal linkage to the President's program.

This development introduces, for the first time in Algeria's constitutional history, the possibility that the government may be led either by a Prime Minister or by a Head of Government. This constitutes a notable evolution that had no precedent in earlier constitutions and represents a shift toward strengthening the legislative branch while introducing a more balanced distribution of authority with the executive. As a result, the government is now confronted with two possible scenarios: it must either implement the program of the parliamentary majority or that of the President of the Republic.

### **Oral and Written Questions**

One of the most significant changes introduced by the 2020 constitutional revision to enhance the effectiveness of the executive institution, affirm its institutional autonomy from the President of the Republic, and empower the parliamentary majority, is the provision allowing for the implementation of a program rooted in the parliamentary majority's platform in cases where the outcome of legislative elections does not align with the presidential majority. In such cases, the President is constitutionally required to appoint a Head of Government from the parliamentary majority, entrusting him with the formation of the government and the preparation of a program based on the electoral platform of that majority (Presidential Decree No. 442–20, 2020).

Accordingly, the Head of Government represents a political majority to which the President may not belong and is bound to formulate and implement a program reflecting that majority's vision. This situation effectively displaces political accountability from the President of the Republic to the parliamentary majority that facilitated the government's formation. Consequently, the government gains legitimacy to execute its political program, grounded in the electoral commitments made to voters during the campaign.

This marks a significant move toward linking political authority with institutional responsibility, and it puts an end to the longstanding justification that governments merely implement the President's vision. It also counters previous practices in which ministers operated with limited oversight, as successive governments have historically encountered little resistance in obtaining the confidence of the National People's Assembly and in securing approval for their action plans.

Nonetheless, the implementation of this reform may be hindered by the practical challenges involved in forming a cohesive parliamentary majority from a single political current capable of constituting a government and executing its political program.

Moreover, a close reading of the second paragraph of Article 110 reveals a regulatory provision concerning the formation of a

government in cases where a parliamentary majority is achieved, a provision that is conspicuously absent in scenarios involving a presidential majority.

This omission lacks a clear constitutional rationale. Some analysts attribute this gap to the political instability that often follows legislative elections in various parliamentary systems, where post-election alliances may be necessary or where no single entity achieves an outright majority sufficient to form a government. Such circumstances frequently result in protracted coalition negotiations, as witnessed in countries such as Lebanon, the United Kingdom, and others (Constitutional Amendment, 2020, art. 110, para. 2). Nevertheless, this does not justify the failure to establish a comparable regulatory provision in the event of a presidential majority (Dhebbah & Gourai, 2021, p. 337).

### **Program Investigation**

A close reading of Articles 105 and 109 reveals that, in cases where legislative elections result in a presidential majority, the government effectively functions as an instrument for executing the President's program. Under such circumstances, the government's role is to structure and implement this program, proposing actionable strategies that address prevailing issues without deviating from the fundamental principles of the President's outlined agenda. In practical terms, implementation has consistently prioritized the presidential program, with successive governments historically refraining from introducing distinct or independent programs within the political arena.

Pursuant to Article 106 of the 2020 constitutional amendment, the government is responsible for preparing its action plan and presenting it to the Council of Ministers. This plan must also be submitted to the National People's Assembly and may be revised following general parliamentary discussions, contingent upon consultation with the President of the Republic.

Consequently, parliamentary oversight extends beyond the mere evaluation of actions already taken. It includes anticipatory oversight of the goals and strategies articulated in the government's action plan, which must undergo discussion and

approval by the National People's Assembly (Constitutional Amendment, 2020, art. 106). Once approved, the Prime Minister is tasked with implementing the program under the scrutiny of parliamentary oversight, primarily by the National People's Assembly, which retains the authority to dismiss the government. By contrast, the Council of the Nation is limited to issuing a resolution and lacks the constitutional competence to initiate dismissal procedures.

### **Subsection Two: Parliamentary Investigative Committees**

The general policy statement delivered by the Prime Minister or the Head of Government, depending on the prevailing configuration, functions as a formal instrument for briefing parliament on the progress achieved during the preceding year, the status of ongoing initiatives, and the difficulties encountered. It also outlines the objectives set for the forthcoming period and identifies potential challenges that may hinder the realization of those goals (Alim, 2020–2021, p. 207).

This annual presentation thus becomes a substantive opportunity for members of parliament to engage directly with the executive, to scrutinize governmental performance, and to evaluate the degree to which the government has adhered to the priorities and obligations set forth in the previously approved program.

To reinforce the effective use of oversight mechanisms, the 2020 constitutional amendment, much like its 2016 predecessor, mandates the annual submission of a policy statement to the National People's Assembly. This obligation was absent in prior constitutional texts. Article 111 specifies: “The Prime Minister or Head of Government, as the case may be, must annually present to the National People's Assembly a statement on general policy” (Constitutional Amendment, 2020, art. 111).

Accordingly, Article 111 constitutes a constitutional safeguard designed to counter the recurrent tendency of governments to disregard this requirement. The annual policy statement is essential for enabling systematic parliamentary oversight, promoting transparency in governmental operations, and ensuring continuity and coherence in the execution of national policy.

Returning to the same article, we find that this obligation applies only to the lower chamber of parliament, while the upper chamber is left with discretion. Nevertheless, it has become customary for the government to also present its statement to the Council of the Nation, making it a constitutional practice that effectively requires such a presentation. Although the policy statement primarily constitutes a significant mechanism for parliamentary oversight, the supervisory procedures it may trigger in terms of governmental accountability are of equal importance. These procedures may include the issuance of resolutions, the vote on a motion of censure, or the refusal to grant a vote of confidence.

- **Issuance of Resolutions:**

These reflect dissatisfaction among a group of parliament members when the annual policy statement fails to convince them. They serve as critiques, observations, and a means of exposing contradictions (Barakat, 2006, p. 242). A resolution can also be a serious step to draw the government's attention to opposition against its adopted policies and act as an early warning that more severe and consequential measures may follow. Conversely, a resolution may also express the parliament's support for the government. It can be issued by the Council of the Nation during the presentation of the government's action plan, as previously mentioned, or by the bicameral parliament during discussions on foreign policy (Barakat, 2006, p. 242).

- **Motion of Censure:**

According to paragraph 4 of Article 111, a motion of censure is the second possible outcome of the policy statement discussion. It is a measure taken by deputies to apply pressure on the government and compel it to resign, unlike a resolution, which has no tangible legal effect (its impact is purely political). The difference lies in the legal weight of the motion of censure, which is subject to specific constitutional requirements concerning the quorum necessary to propose or vote on it, as well as constitutionally defined deadlines for its discussion (Constitutional Amendment, 2020, arts. 161–162).

Despite its importance, the motion of censure remains difficult to implement due to the stringent conditions imposed by the legislator on the one hand, and the parliamentary majority's support for the government on the other. As for the opposition, even if it exists, practical reality shows the difficulty it faces in submitting such a motion. Even if it manages to gather the required signatures to propose it, it cannot guarantee the necessary majority to adopt it.

• **Vote of Confidence:**

To safeguard its political standing, the Constitution grants the government recourse to a specific procedure designed to reinforce its position in the face of opposition, namely, the vote of confidence. The Prime Minister or the Head of Government, depending on the institutional context, may request a renewed vote of confidence from the parliament when confronted with significant political resistance (Constitutional Amendment, 2020, art. 111, paras. 5–6). Should the motion of confidence fail, the Prime Minister or Head of Government is constitutionally obliged to submit the resignation of the government.

Although this procedure is formally classified as a mechanism of parliamentary oversight, it simultaneously operates as a strategic instrument through which the executive may exert pressure on the legislative branch. In instances where the National People's Assembly refuses to endorse the motion of confidence, the government may collapse, or, alternatively, the Assembly itself may be dissolved through a presidential decree. On the one hand, if the Assembly withholds its approval, the Prime Minister or Head of Government is required to resign. On the other hand, the President of the Republic may opt to dissolve the Assembly rather than accept the government's resignation. This dual outcome renders the mechanism a double-edged sword, often compelling deputies to avoid voting against confidence in order to protect their parliamentary mandates (Khelloufi, 2020, p. 230).

Accordingly, a critical observation concerning the 2020 constitutional amendment is that the capacity for institutional deterrence remains exclusively vested in the President of the

Republic, without any corresponding counterweight or institutional constraint. So long as the parliament remains subject to the looming threat of dissolution, it cannot operate as a genuinely autonomous body of oversight vis-à-vis the executive. This consultation process is purely advisory and imposes no obligation on the President to justify his decision. (Constitutional Amendment, 2020, Art. 151, para. 1)

In cases where the parliamentary majority is politically opposed to the President, the option to dissolve parliament may be strategically employed to secure a more favorable majority capable of supporting the formation of a new government. In this context, it would have been prudent to introduce at least one formal limitation, such as prohibiting the dissolution of parliament within the first ten months of its mandate.

### **Subsection Three: Interpellation as a Mechanism That Triggers Political Accountability in the New Constitutional Amendment**

In continuity with the previous constitutional revision, the 2020 amendment reaffirms interpellation as a legitimate and constitutionally grounded tool through which members of parliament may hold government officials to account (Oussif, 2016, p. 363). The very notion of interpellation conveys a strong sense of institutional reproach, often associated with direct criticism or denunciation of government conduct or policy. Deputies are thus entitled to initiate interpellations concerning any issue deemed of national significance, or in relation to the status of legal implementation. These interpellations may be addressed to the Prime Minister, the Head of Government, or to any minister, with the constitutional obligation that a response be issued within thirty days.

What distinguishes the 2020 amendment is its alignment with more rigorous procedural requirements related to the interpellation process and its potential consequences. The outcome of an interpellation is now linked more directly to the government's official response. Parliamentary deliberations may conclude with either a resolution expressing support and gratitude for the government, or a motion of censure, which may

result in political consequences, either for the government as a whole or for the individual minister concerned (Neqadi, 2014, p. 74). This linkage enhances the weight of the interpellation mechanism and incentivizes members of parliament to exercise their right to invoke it, notwithstanding its procedural complexity, given the substantive outcomes it may produce.

It has now become possible for an interpellation to be followed by, or concluded with, the initiation of political accountability through a motion of censure, provided it is supported by one-seventh (1/7) of the members of the National People's Assembly. This development is particularly significant, given that interpellation has become a mandatory consequence of the government's failure to respond to either oral or written questions. As it currently stands, each interpellation must now conclude with a formal resolution (Constitutional Amendment, 2020, art. 161).

This addition has the potential to bring about a considerable shift from the previous constitutional framework. It alters the earlier provisions that had constrained the utility of interpellation, stripping it of enforceability and reducing it to a purely informational function devoid of substantive political implications. With the new constitutional configuration, interpellation is endowed with procedural strength and potential consequences, thereby transforming it into an effective tool of parliamentary oversight.

### **CONCLUSION:**

In conclusion, it can be stated that Algeria was presented with a genuine opportunity through the 2020 constitutional amendment to implement meaningful reforms that align with the aspirations of the Algerian people, who have long been at the forefront of transformative movements. These reforms aimed to strengthen the exercise of political rights and improve parliamentary operations, although they fell short of achieving the desired outcomes, as citizens had hoped for true political reforms that would foster real governance rooted in the popular will. Therefore, it was crucial to revisit the constitutional texts related to parliamentary oversight. We have identified several key

conclusions that could serve as foundational elements for evaluating the role of Parliament and its effectiveness, which are outlined in the following points:

**Findings:**

- The Algerian constitutional amendment does not focus on specific provisions but rather on the mechanisms of governance across all its dimensions, highlighting the social interests that contribute to collaborative efforts. It also emphasizes the role of Parliament in the broader political landscape.
- This bold amendment represents an attempt to enhance parliamentary performance by introducing additional tools aimed at reforming and activating its role. These tools contribute to strengthening parliamentary oversight and organizing public opinion on political issues, thereby reflecting the will of the people.

Despite these efforts, some shortcomings persist, particularly the continued reliance on traditional methods within Parliament. The government must strive to avoid these shortcomings and recognize the laws that can actively engage in voting and involve the executive branch in decision-making.

**Recommendations:**

- Algeria is on the path to ensuring the government's commitment to responding to public inquiries, which have, until now, been addressed only through committees of the previous government.
- It is essential to create platforms that allow young people to engage with political and administrative matters, providing opportunities for interaction with various governmental sectors without exception.
- Greater emphasis should be placed on communication within the administrative domain, especially when making critical decisions that will ensure the continuity of systems that serve the public interest.
- It is important to establish the political accountability of the Prime Minister in relation to the President of the Republic, alongside the responsibilities of the Prime Minister himself.

• Finally, reducing the quorum required for key decisions would help achieve political goals and streamline the process of governance.

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